CRITICAL ANALYSIS: THE IMPACT OF VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS ON WORLD PEACE

 

INTRODUCTION

The world is so much diverse that different ethnic groups and religious groups and movements are inter-connected to each other in different ways. Actions of such a group in one state are monitored by the similar groups in other states. These groups and movement belong to the international system of non-state actors.

The state, which is the primary actor in international affairs, is being challenged by variety of relatively newcomers to the international arena, the non-state actors. They are primarily multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, and super-empowered individuals. These non-state actors are transforming international relations.

Non-state actors are entities with no sovereign status and they exercise significant economic, political, or social power and influence at a national, and in some cases international, level. There is no consensus on the members of this category, and according to other definitions trade unions, community organizations, religious institutions, ethnic groupings, and universities in addition to the players outlined above are included.

Furthermore, among the non-state actors there are terrorists and international criminals and those non-criminal non-state actors as mentioned above. The non-state actors which may cause grave damage to the world peace are those who violate national and international laws. And they are labeled as violent (involving physical activities which forces to hurt and kill innocence people and damage people’s property with no just cause) and armed non-state actors.

These armed non-state actors involved in the internal armed conflicts mostly act in the cause to achieve some political agenda, which ultimately harms the innocent people. When innocent people are harmed and the state does not take any actions against those who commit the international crime thus, result being the international community’s reaction to solve the situation in that particular state. 

According to the topic, the impact of violent non-state actors on the world peace can be critically analyzed using some recent examples of violent non-state actors. In this era these actors are armed and violent. To explain this phenomenon, the example of the Nigerian armed separatist movement, Boko Haram and other violent non-state actors will be critically analyzed. Any armed group including government forces and other armed non-state actors are biding to International Law, International Humanitarian Law and the International Human Rights Law. And those who violate these laws will have an impact on world peace. As these laws are made to maintain peace.

WHY THE BOKO HARAM MOVEMENT STARTED AND IS IT AN ARMED NON-STATE ACTOR?

First and foremost, it is important to know about the Boko Haram. According to an article wrote in BBC website on 20^th May 2014, Boko Haram promotes a version of Islam which makes it "haram", or forbidden, for Muslims to take part in any political or social activity associated with Western society, which includes voting in elections, wearing shirts and trousers or receiving a secular education. This presumes a serious concern to the whole Islamic Nation of the world, where these kinds of actions are totally different ideologies even in the real practices of the religion. Islam never teaches to violate human rights, but the Bokko Haram is already violating. This concludes that Boko Haram had started against the so called western culture.

The Boko Haram is an armed non-state actor. According to the Geneva Call (2013) the term armed non-State actors (ANSAs) includes a variety of entities and the Geneva Call focuses on organized armed entities involved in internal armed conflicts that are primarily motivated by political goals, operate outside State control and therefore lack the legal capacity to become party to relevant international treaties.

Boko Haram is also an anarchist movement that has created lawlessness within the Nigerian state.

RELATING THE CONTEXT OF ANARCHY TO BOKO HARAM

Next question is why could not Nigerian Government contain this group? When a country is in a state of anarchy there is no control over its laws and regulations (lawlessness), the people starts to divide and starts movements against the government. As the Boko Haram is saying that it will change the government by force. When the Boko Haram says there should be no voting or wearing shirts and trousers and so on, they are simply going against the world order. This can be one reason that Boko Haram movement is having an impact on world peace.

As per Neumann and Waever (1997) “anarchy is reproduced when each state seeks to protect itself against the threats posed by other states”. Here the other states can be armed non-state actors. The Nigerian government has lost control of a minority group named as the Boko Haram. Initially it started as a political movement and later escalated to an armed group.

Furthermore, Neumann and Waever (1997) describes what Wendt (1987: 360) said: “social structures are the results of the intended and unintended consequences of unman action, just as those actions presuppose or are mediated by an irreducible structural context”. They have also mentioned about international politics “with each country constrained to take care of itself, no one can take care of the system” (Waltz 1979: 106). More over Waltz also describes the international system is decentralized and anarchical and the State is the only relevant actor.

HOW BOKO HARAM WILL IMPACT THE WORLD PEACE

In the international system Boko Haram is a national liberation movement for its own cause. In international relations these movements are positive actions to achieve their needs in their country. But the reality is Boko Haram’s actions are totally violating the international law. They have taken law in their hands and forged a justice of their own, to form an Islamic State by toppling the existing government.

Some of the actions of Boko Haram that would affect world peace includes the killings of thousands of civilians mostly in the north-eastern Nigeria - also attacked police and UN headquarters in capital, Abuja.

Boko Haram has been labeled as a terrorist organization by the United States in 2010, amid fears that it had developed links with other militant groups, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, to wage a global jihad (BBC, 2014).

The more the other countries involved in the Nigerian conflict for the peace solution, those countries may have a threat as they are interfering a religious ideology which other international organizations may have started to follow or tend to follow. Some other countries including France and Britain have joined the search team in the search for the missing school girls who have being abducted by the suspect Boko Haram militants (BBC, 2014).

A FOCUS ON THE IMPACT ON WORLD PEACE BY OTHER VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS’

The United States President, Barak Obama had said that Boko Haram terrorist group and other terrorist organization around the world were serious threats to the world peace (BBC, 2014).

In a report by Francis (2013) discusses about the regional impact of armed conflicts that the Islamist militant group in Mali is a threat to international peace and the international community did not act to solve the conflict for nearly ten months, which allowed the militants to take over the whole of northern Mali and impose Sharia Law and the French military intervention in Mali placed the country at the top of the international affairs agenda.  This has caused wider implications not only for Mali and its neighbours, but the whole of Africa and the international community.

The conflict in Mali is described as a complex and multidimensional mixture of long-term fundamental grievances by diverse actors and groups, which was caused by first, a secessionist rebellion by Tuareg ethnic groups in northern Mali fighting for a separate independent state. Then if followed by a political and constitutional crisis occasioned by the military overthrow of the democratically elected government by the army, and the conflict is also an attempt by Islamist jihadists to militarily take over Mali and establish a terrorist state based on Sharia law (Francis, 2013).  Here also it was found that Mali was an anarchic state. An anarchic state may have an impact on world peace. For its security and protection, it may start armed conflicts between bordering states.

THEORITICAL VIEWS ON PEACE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

According to Hamza Jehangir (2012), understanding the prospects for peace in international relations, it is important to know why war is such a reoccurring event in the history of nation-states and also the nature of international affairs and the determining factors which cause action, reaction, cooperation, hostility and peace between states in the international system. And to know that realism and liberalism have accounted for much of what has taken place in the international arena and they continue to offer prescriptions of state behaviour and its possible effects on peace in-between nation states.  But these theories discuss only about states’ behaviour.

IMPACT ON DOMESTIC PEACE

These impacts are physical, sexual or mental harm or suffering to women and men, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life, which is defined by the UN as GBV (Zenn and Pearson, 2010). According to Zenn and Pearson (2010) there is evidence that gender is an increasingly significant component of Boko Haram’s tactics, messaging, and violence.

The continuous kidnapping of women and school girls has a great impact for the future of women in Nigeria. According further reports Boko Haram has been conducting GBV against Christian women in northern areas of Nigeria, and increasing levels of sexual violence including rape, torture and also murder.

Here the violation of peace indicated that the Boko Haram is victimizing women and the act of terrorizing the Christian communities.

IMPACT ON REGIONAL PEACE

The way that the Nigerian government’s weak response to the abduction of more than 200 schoolgirls, the West African countries had asked the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on Boko Haram and declare it a terrorist organization where Boko Haram is being assisted by other regional Jihadist groups in West Africa like AQIM and its splinter group MUJAO (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa) in Mali and these groups has increased Boko Haram capacities, especially in terms of financial resources, military arsenals, and training facilities that were made available (O'Reilly, 2014).

This means that other separatist groups join hands with the Boko Haram the regional stability in Western Africa is vulnerable to the regional peace. Ultimately neighbouring states relations are vulnerable which may cause a conflict between states. The diplomatic relations and peace of the regional states has weaken due to the process.

IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL PEACE

The diplomatic relations also have a consequential effect of Boko Haram insurgency on the relationship between Nigeria and other Nation of the World. Especially the violent actions of Boko Haram in Nigeria has negatively affected the relationship between Nigeria and other Nation of the world because of bombing to the UN Headquarters building in Abuja in couple with abductions of innocent school children taking with or without demand for ransom and particularly of alien which have resulted to demised of some of them and have greatly been an object of disturb not only to Nigeria but peace of International Community (Aro, 2013).

CONCLUSIONS

To sum up the formation of the Boko Haram had many crucial issues which in future other nations need to consider and adjust the operational methods of the governments to avoid an eruption of such a violent organization and ultimately causing damage to world peace. Firstly, the Nigeria had failed good governance and good leadership, which lead to social injustice, marginalization and neglect. End result causing corruption and under development in citizens, human rights violations and have no positivism towards economic empowerment and employment generation.

Ultimatum was forming this insurgent movement against the government and at the beginning or the infant stage of the Boko Haram the government’s attitude towards crisis was flatfooted.

REFERENCES

 

1.                   Neumann, I and Waever, O (1997) p.271 & 272. The Future of International Relations.

2.                   O'Reilly, M (2014). Sanctions Needed for Boko Haram, But Weakest Link Is in Regional Response at: http://theglobalobservatory.org/interviews/745-international-sanctions-needed-for-boko-haram-but-weakest-link-is-at-regional-level.html [Accessed 4^th July 2014]

3.                   Aro, O (2013). ‘Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: Its Implication and Way Forwards toward Avoidance of Future Insurgency’ International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, Volume 3, Issue 11, November 2013 3 ISSN 2250-3153 [Online] at: http://www.academia.edu/3559251/BOKO_HARAM_INSURGENCY_IN_NIGERIA_ITS_IMPLICATION_AND_WAY_FORWARDS_TOWARD_AVOIDANCE_OF_FUTURE_INSURGENCY

4.                   Zenn, J and Pearson, E (2010). ‘Women, Gender and the Evolving Tactics of Boko Haram’ Journal of Terrorism Research Volume 5, Issue 1 Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence [Online] at: https://ojs.st-andrews.ac.uk/index.php/jtr/article/view/828/707 [Accessed 4^th July 2014]

5.                   BBC (2014). Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists? at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13809501 [Accessed 1^st July 2014]

6.                   Geneva Call (2013). Armed Non-state Actors at: http://www.genevacall.org/how-we-work/armed-non-state-actors/ [Accessed 2^nd July 2014]

7.                   Francis, D (2013). The regional impact of the armed conflict and French intervention in Mali at: http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/f18726c3338e39049bd4d554d4a22c36.pdf [Accessed 2^nd July 2014]

8.                   Jehangir, H. (2012). Realism, Liberalism and the Possibilities of Peace at: http://www.e-ir.info/2012/02/19/realism-liberalism-and-the-possibilities-of-peace/ [Accessed 2^nd July 2014]

A Hero of Military Arts: Khalid ibn al Waleed

 Introduction

Khalid ibn al Waleed was one of the greatest generals in Islamic History. He commanded and fought in the conquests of the Islamic caliphates’ rule during the 6^th century. Khalid was the champion of many decisive battles, such as the battle against the Persians and the Byzantines.

Khalid was a military strategist and commander with very few equals in human history, a man who turned many a defeat into glorious victories.

Khalid at Battle of Uhud

The first military encounter in which Khalid showed his virtuosity was the Battle of Uhud, which he (while a polytheist) caused to be the worst for Muslims in the early days of Islam. 

In the Battle of Uhad, before the battle took place, the Prophet (ﷺ) had put 50 archers under Abdullah bin Jubair at a mountainside and ordered them strictly to stay there until further orders, whatever may be the condition. They were to obstruct the enemy if they attacked the Muslims from the rear. However, when the battle proved initially to be in favour of the Muslim army, the archers forgot the orders of their commander and around 40 of the rearguards descended the mountain and left the Muslims vulnerable to a counter attack by the enemy.

Khalid bin Waleed saw the sudden vacuum created by the disappearance of the rearguard and his cavalrymen attacked the Muslims from behind, killing many in the process. When the Muslims saw themselves surrounded, they were overtaken by panic and disorder and failed to map out a cohesive plan.

Later on when Khalid embraced Islam he joined the Muslim army. Then the Muslims gained a true military genius who was both an excellent strategist and a fierce fighter and army commander.

Decisive Battles and the Succession of Command

The first battle in which Khalid won the day for Muslims was the Muslims’ first encounter with the Byzantine army in the Battle of Mu’tah on the Northern borders of the Arabian Peninsula. Due to the dangerous nature of the battle, Prophet Muhammad (ﷺ) chose three commanders to succeed one another and Khalid was not amongst them right then.

The Byzantine army proved to be too large in number in comparison with the small number of the Muslims. Yet, the Muslim army never hesitated to enter the battle with Khalid once he had assumed command.

The three commanders were killed, and the banner was about to fall when Thabit ibn AI-Arqam saved it and handed over to our hero Khalid, because he was more knowledgeable in matters of war. In the beginning Khalid refused because he felt Thabit was more worthy of leading the army due to his age and service. But he accepted at Thabit’s insistence and the unanimous consent of the soldiers. The battle was not in favour of the Muslims, due to the huge number of the Byzantines and the death of the three commanders appointed by the Prophet (ﷺ).

During the encounter with the Byzantine army the arts of war of Khalid was well crafted. The only way to save the day was to retreat, but that was almost impossible, since the Muslim army was surrounded. It was here the prodigy of Khalid was highlighted in the battle.
For, despite the extreme difficulty of the situation, he reshuffled the right and left flanks of the Muslim army and introduced forward a division from the rear in order to cast fear in the hearts of the enemy forces. A deception to the enemy who then thought that fresh reinforcements had arrived. Though clever planning and courageous fighting, Khalid managed to make an opening within the lines of the enemy through which the Muslim army managed to get out safely. We are told in Sahih Al-Bukhari that our hero used seven swords that all broke in that battle. Thus, it was that Khalid ibn AI-Waleed was given the title of Sayf-ul-llah. ‘The Sword of Allah.’

Battle Estimations and Situational Awareness of Khalid

In every battle Khalid fought his war crafts and situational awareness was shown to the highest level a military commander could exercise. During planning for battle, Khalid used to go up to the top of nearby hills and studied the situation to recce and discover the weak spots of the enemy. He then re-organized his army.

The Battle of Buzakha took place between Muslim forces under the command of Khalid the sword of Allah and Tulieha, the false Prophet, in September 632. Khalid had 6,000 men under his disposal while Tuleiha had 15,000 men. The battle resulted in Muslim victory.

After a careful analysis of the situation and a study of his enemy, Khalid laid down a very careful strategy. Since the Muslim army was outnumbered and the Romans were better equipped and experienced. There were also many newly recruited soldiers from the region and Khalid kept the tempo of the battle by motivating the soldiers and ensured their moral values were strengthened. The battle was a very fierce one, but with their unlimited faith and the Muslims fought fearlessly, to the extent that with a band of only 100 fighters Khalid faced a whole division of many thousand Roman soldiers.

Strategic Decision Making of Khalid

During the critical moment of the battle of Yarmouk, Khalid was informed the death of the Caliphate Abu Bakr and the new instructions came to the change of command of the army. But to avoid any chaos in the fight, he kept the matter in secret until victory was achieved. For this decision he came famous among military commanders.

Conclusion

Wining of decisive battles, the command and leadership philosophy, forecasting vision and situational awareness of Khalid made him a strategic commander in the history of Islam. A hero for the military strategists.

References

“Mount Uhud and Site of Battle | Islamic Landmarks". 2019. Islamic Landmarks. https://www.islamiclandmarks.com/madinah-other/mount-uhud-and-site-of-battle.

“Khalid Ibn Al-Waleed - Islamic History". 2019. Islamic History. https://islamichistory.org/khalid-ibn-al-waleed/.

“Khalid Ibn Walid - Battle of Buzakha - Tulaihah The False Prophet". 2019. Youtube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NPqPW7vAg_0.

Ṣīnī, Maḥmūd Ismāʻīl. 2009. Heroes of Islam. Riyadh [etc.]: Darussalam.

EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE REGIME IN THE COUNTER-TERRORISM CONVENTIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

by A Ahmed Rasheed

INTRODUCTION

1.                  Extradition is the official process whereby one country transfers a suspected or convicted criminal to another country.

2.                  The fundamental dilemma posed by the position of States as interested parties in terrorism cases lies at the base of the political debate concerning the best design of criminal jurisdiction over terrorism. The terrorism treaties, with their ‘extradite or prosecute” clauses, have fallen far short of resolving the difficulties concerning jurisdiction over terrorist offences. Because international terrorism is flawed in so far as it relies on States: non-neutral perpetrator States, or non-neutral targeted states, or third party States that, in fact, cannot be presumed to be or will not be perceived to be neutral. Similarly, because of the political features of international terrorism, utilizing international forums for the prosecution of terrorist crimes also does not satisfactorily fulfill the complex requirements for effective enforcement in this field. The inherent political hindrances to effective use of international forums for the prosecution of terrorist offences are well illustrated in the context of the ICC.

3.                  The question of combating international terrorism has dominated the UN agenda since the 1970s and to be exact it was after the 9/11 attacks in the United States. And in history the international cooperation to combat terrorism was first dealt by the League of Nations. The first instrument adopted by the League of Nations, the resolution of 10^th December 1934 states that: “It is the duty of every State either to encourage nor tolerate on its territory any terrorist activity with a political purpose”; and “Every State must do all in its power to prevent and repress acts of this nature and must for this purpose lend its assistance to governments which request it”.

EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE

4.                  The obligation to extradite or prosecute is found in a number of treaties. And survey reveals that there are over 60 multilateral treaties combining extradition and prosecution as the courses of action to bring suspects to justice (Chatham House, 2013).

5.                  On the other hand regards the core crimes under international law, the obligation of aut dedere aut judicare relates only to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I. There is no treaty-based obligation to neither prosecute or extradite for genocide, crimes against humanity, nor– except in cases of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions – serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts of an international or non-international character (Chatham House, 2013). Also according to the Internation Law Summary by Chatham House (2013) a common feature of the different treaties embodying the obligation to extradite or prosecute is that they impose upon states an obligation to ensure the prosecution of the offender, either by extraditing the individual to a state that will exercise jurisdiction or by enabling their own judicial authorities to prosecute. Beyond that, the provisions greatly vary in their formulation content and scope, particularly with regards to the conditions for extradition and prosecution and also the relationship between those two possible courses of action.

6.                  The core legal common to the sectoral conventions is one which imposes an obligation on State Parties to “extradite or prosecute” (aut dedere, aut judicare). For that reason, where an alleged offender is present on the territory of State Party, having committed a crime in the territory of another State Party, and where the former does not extradite the offender, to the latter, for any reason, the former State Party is obliged without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed on its territory, to submit the case undue delay, to its Competent Authorities for purpose of prosecution.

7.                  The underlying rationale of the “extradite or prosecute regime” is that no terrorist offender should find “safe haven” on the territory on any State party.

8.                  Transnational Organized Crime (2000) and article 44 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (2003) as well as, inter alia, to implement UNSCR 1373 (2001) and its requirements of denying safe haven to those who finance, plan, support or commit terrorist acts, and ensuring that such persons are brought to justice. In reviewing the Manual on the Model Treaty on Extradition, reference is also made, where necessary and for the purpose of providing a comparative approach, to the following international instruments:

8.1.             United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988 Drug Convention).

8.2.             International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999) (Terrorist Financing Convention).

8.3.             International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997) (Terrorist Bombing Convention).

8.4.             European Convention on Extradition (1957) (Council of Europe 1957 Convention).

8.5.             Convention on Simplified Extradition Procedure between the Member States of the European Union (1995) (EU 1995 Convention).

8.6.             Convention relating to extradition between the Member States of the European Union (1996) (EU 1996 Convention).

9.                  The objective of the sectoral approach is to increase the network of the States ratifying these conventions and thereby provide for the widest possible network of treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute. The “extradite or prosecute regime” in the sectoral conventions is complimented by provision on facilitating extradition arrangements between State Parties and the rendering of mutual legal assistance. And also all the sectoral conventions provide that in the absence of a bi-lateral extradition treaty between State Parties, the relevant sectoral conventions could, at the discretion of the State Parties, constitute the legal basis for extradition amongst them, in respect of the offences set forth in the convention. Therefore a request for extradition would not fail, on a procedural technicality, viz by the fact of the absence of an extradition treaty.

ANALYSIS ON INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM BOMBINGS

10.              The above mentioned convention a “New Generation” convention. These conventions contain wide ranging provision on rendering of mutual assistance amongst State Parties. Thus the convention provides for, apart from the traditional provisions of  mutual legal assistance to facilitate criminal proceedings found in the precedent conventions, wide ranging measures of cooperation like measures to counter preparation in their respective territories for the commission of the offences covered by the convention, including measures to prohibit in their territories illegal activities of persons groups and organizations that encourage, instigate, organize, knowingly finance or engage in the preparation of offences relating to terrorist bombings; exchanging of information including on preventive measures, cooperation and transfer of technology, equipment and related materials in relation to terrorist bombings.

11.              Before proceeding further it is important to look at what the Article 2 of the convention says:

“ 1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally delivers, places, discharges or detonates an explosive or other lethal device in, into or against a place of public use, a state government facility, a public transportation system or an infrastructure facility: (a) with the intent to cause death or seriously bodily injury: or (b) with the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a place, facility or system, where such destruction results in or is likely to result in major economic loss.

2. Any person also commits an offence if that person attempts to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1.

3. Any person also commits an offence if that person: (a) participate as an accomplice in an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 or 2; or (b) organize or directs others to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 or 2; or (c) In any other way contributes to the commission of one or more offences as set forth in paragraph 1 or 2 by a group of persons acting with a common purpose; such contribution shall be intentional and either be made with the aim of furthering the general criminal activity or purpose of the group to commit the offence or offences concerned.

12.              Hence in relation with this article it will be easy for the explanations and analyses of the follow on articles for the purpose of extradite or prosecute regime. The article 6 says: “Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences set forth in article 2”. Whether the offence is committed in the territory of that state or any other place which officially belongs to the State.

13.              According to article 8 if a State does not extradite that person who commit the offence, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case without delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution in accordance with the laws of that State. This means there will be no chances for the offenders to escape punishments. Paragraph 2 of article 8 says: “whenever a state is permitted under its domestic law to extradite or otherwise surrender one of its nationals only upon the conditions that the person will be returned to that State to serve the sentence imposed as a result of the trial or proceeding for which the extradition or surrender of the person was sought, and this State and the State seeking the extradition of the person agree with this option and other terms they deem appropriate, such a conditional extradition or surrender shall be sufficient to discharge the obligation set forth in paragraph 1”.  Again this article describes that there is no permanent extradition. Only till the sentences are over.

14.              Whether a State Party has not signed in a treaty the extradition or prosecution should take place in respect of the offence set forth in the article 2 of the terrorist bombing convention.

15.              On the other hand the article 11 says that extradition cannot be used for the sole purpose of political agendas.  But no offences offence set forth in article 2 shall be regarded for the purposes of extradition as a political offence or an offence connected with a political offence.

16.              The sooner this convention was came into effect different States identified possible ways to further strengthen the international legal anti-terrorism regime that should include:

16.1.         Consequences of terrorist activities

16.2.         Acts of armed forces of a State when those actions violate provisions of the UN Charter or international law of armed conflict

16.3.         Agreement on a definition of terrorism and terrorist acts and distinction between terrorism and struggle for independence and

16.4.         Measures dealing with WMD terrorism.

17.              Considering all these articles and concepts there is no way that a State Party can hold a terrorist in its territory without extradition. Otherwise the prosecute regime can be implemented on the State which is hiding the terrorists as well as allowing terrorist activities.

18.              One more example on the prevention of terrorism in the world is the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, also describes, the purpose and principles of the UN Charter concerning the maintenance of international peace and the promotion of friendly relations and cooperation among States, believing that the commission of such crimes is a matter of grave concern to the international community.

19.              Article 7 of the latter mentioned Convention states: “ the State party in  whose territory the alleged offender is present shall, if it does not extradite him, submit, without exception whatsoever and without undue delay, the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with that State.

OTHER CONVENTIONS WHICH SUPPORTS TO EXTRADITION OR PROSECUTE REGIME

20.              Here is a summary of the 14 major legal instruments and additional amendments dealing with terrorism and the State Parties have to criminalize the unlawful possession by restraints, take custody, punishing offenders in order to maintain law and order in the world. And these conventions emphasize the State Parties to extradite the terrorists to the respective States to implement the prosecution process.

1. 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft
(Aircraft Convention)

• Applies to acts affecting in-flight safety;
• Authorizes the aircraft commander to impose reasonable measures, including restraint, on any person he or she has reason to believe has committed or is about to commit such an act, where necessary to protect the safety of the aircraft; and
• Requires contracting States to take custody of offenders and to return control of the aircraft to the lawful commander.

2. 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
(Unlawful Seizure Convention)

• Makes it an offence for any person on board an aircraft in flight to "unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or any other form of intimidation, [to] seize or exercise control of that aircraft" or to attempt to do so;
• Requires parties to the convention to make hijackings punishable by "severe penalties"
• Requires parties that have custody of offenders to either extradite the offender or submit the case for prosecution; and
• Requires parties to assist each other in connection with criminal proceedings brought under the Convention.

2010 Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft

• Supplements the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft by expanding its scope to cover different forms of aircraft hijackings, including through modern technological means;
• Incorporates the provisions of Beijing Convention relating to a threat or conspiracy to commit an offence.

3. 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation
(Civil Aviation Convention)

• Makes it an offence for any person unlawfully and intentionally to perform an act of violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight, if that act is likely to endanger the safety of the aircraft; to place an explosive device on an aircraft; to attempt such acts; or to be an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to perform such acts;
• Requires parties to the Convention to make offences punishable by "severe penalties"; and
• Requires parties that have custody of offenders to either extradite the offender or submit the case for prosecution.

4. 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons
(Diplomatic Agents Convention)

• Defines an "internationally protected person" as a Head of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs, representative or official of a State or international organization who is entitled to special protection in a foreign State, and his/her family; and
• Requires parties to criminalize and make punishable "by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature" the intentional murder, kidnapping or other attack upon the person or liberty of an internationally protected person, a violent attack upon the official premises, the private accommodations, or the means of transport of such person; a threat or attempt to commit such an attack; and an act "constituting participation as an accomplice".

5. 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages
(Hostages Convention)

• Provides that "any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure, or to continue to detain another person in order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence of taking of hostage within the meaning of this Convention".

6. 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
(Nuclear Materials Convention)

• Criminalizes the unlawful possession, use, transfer or theft of nuclear material and threats to use nuclear material to cause death, serious injury or substantial property damage.

Amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

• Makes it legally binding for States Parties to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage as well as transport; and
• Provides for expanded cooperation between and among States regarding rapid measures to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material, mitigate any radiological consequences or sabotage, and prevent and combat related offences.

7. 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Extends and supplements the Montreal Convention on Air Safety)
(Airport Protocol)

• Extends the provisions of the Montreal Convention (see No. 3 above) to encompass terrorist acts at airports serving international civil aviation.

8. 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
(Maritime Convention)

• Establishes a legal regime applicable to acts against international maritime navigation that is similar to the regimes established for international aviation; and
• Makes it an offence for a person unlawfully and intentionally to seize or exercise control over a ship by force, threat, or intimidation; to perform an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of the ship; to place a destructive device or substance aboard a ship; and other acts against the safety of ships.

2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation

• Criminalizes the use of a ship as a device to further an act of terrorism;
• Criminalizes the transport on board a ship various materials knowing that they are intended to be used to cause, or in a threat to cause, death or serious injury or damage to further an act of terrorism;
• Criminalizes the transporting on board a ship of persons who have committed an act of terrorism; and
• Introduces procedures for governing the boarding of a ship believed to have committed an offence under the Convention.

9. 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf
(Fixed Platform Protocol)

• Establishes a legal regime applicable to acts against fixed platforms on the continental shelf that is similar to the regimes established against international aviation.

2005 Protocol to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf

• Adapts the changes to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation to the context of fixed platforms located on the continental shelf.

10. 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection
(Plastic Explosives Convention)

• Designed to control and limit the used of unmarked and undetectable plastic explosives (negotiated in the aftermath of the 1988 Pan Am flight 103 bombing);
• parties are obligated in their respective territories to ensure effective control over "unmarked" plastic explosive, i.e., those that do not contain one of the detection agents described in the Technical Annex to the treaty;
• Generally speaking, each party must, inter alia, take necessary and effective measures to prohibit and prevent the manufacture of unmarked plastic explosives; prevent the movement of unmarked plastic explosives into or out of its territory; exercise strict and effective control over possession and transfer of unmarked explosives made or imported prior to the entry into force of the Convention; ensure that all stocks of unmarked explosives not held by the military or police are destroyed, consumed, marked, or rendered permanently ineffective within three years; take necessary measures to ensure that unmarked plastic explosives held by the military or police are destroyed, consumed, marked or rendered permanently ineffective within fifteen years; and, ensure the destruction, as soon as possible, of any unmarked explosives manufactured after the date of entry into force of the Convention for that State.

11. 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings
(Terrorist Bombing Convention)

• Creates a regime of universal jurisdiction over the unlawful and intentional use of explosives and other lethal devices in, into, or against various defined public places with intent to kill or cause serious bodily injury, or with intent to cause extensive destruction of the public place.

12. 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
(Terrorist Financing Convention)

• Requires parties to take steps to prevent and counteract the financing of terrorists, whether direct or indirect, through groups claiming to have charitable, social or cultural goals or which also engage in illicit activities such as drug trafficking or gun running;
• Commits States to hold those who finance terrorism criminally, civilly or administratively liable for such acts; and
• Provides for the identification, freezing and seizure of funds allocated for terrorist activities, as well as for the sharing of the forfeited funds with other States on a case-by-case basis. Bank secrecy is no longer adequate justification for refusing to cooperate.

13. 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
(Nuclear Terrorism Convention)

• Covers a broad range of acts and possible targets, including nuclear power plants and nuclear reactors;
• Covers threats and attempts to commit such crimes or to participate in them, as an accomplice;
• Stipulates that offenders shall be either extradited or prosecuted;
• Encourages States to cooperate in preventing terrorist attacks by sharing information and assisting each other in connection with criminal investigations and extradition proceedings; and
• Deals with both crisis situations (assisting States to solve the situation) and post-crisis situations (rendering nuclear material safe through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

14. 2010 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation
(New civil aviation convention)

• Criminalizes the act of using civil aircraft as a weapon to cause death, injury or damage;
• Criminalizes the act of using civil aircraft to discharge biological, chemical and nuclear (BCN) weapons or similar substances to cause death, injury or damage, or the act of using such substances to attack civil aircraft;
• Criminalizes the act of unlawful transport of BCN weapons or certain related material;
• A cyber attack on air navigation facilities constitutes an offence;
• A threat to commit an offence may be an offence by itself, if the threat is credible.
• Conspiracy to commit an offence, or its equivalence, is punishable.

 

CONCLUSIONS

21.              Hence there is no doubt that almost all conventions on terrorism states the necessity of punishing the offenders, especially those who commits terrorist activities within or outside State Parties, shall be extradite or prosecute regime in respective to their offences.

22.              According to the ICC norms it is in fact, the principle aut dedere aut judicare (duty to prosecute or extradite) is considered as representing not only a rule of customary international law but also a rule of jus cogens. At the Rome Conference, Croatia suggested the inclusion of a provision under which a state should not refuse a request for surrender of persons by the Court as obligations deriving from such a request shall prevail over any legal impediment to do so, be it under national law or extradition treaties of the state concerned.

REFERENCES

1.                  Chatham House (July 2013), International Law Summary, International criminals: Extradite or Prosecution? Available at: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/International%20Law/110713summary.pdf [Accessed 15 October 2014]